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And then all this loyal Ipecacuanha in the paragrafs of litterary
drudges!
O Pittites! insects of the moonshine! race of vileness! You have made
me contemn the Land I came to adore.
Always, a dull petty Person for the servile idolatry of this grand Mob,
instead of a noble eternal Principle.
They wanted a king: Well, there is one in the person  of so noble a
Prince. They wanted a king: not a lame Regent, not an abracadabrous
phantom. He stood before them: the Law was plain: how simple! But
what is simplicity of reason and plainness of public Law for a cun-
ning Juggler, and a people that can be a juggler
He paid his vile suspicious compliments of Parricide and High trea-
son to the Prince. But what is more striking: he told through his Plan and
Conduct the majestic People of England these very words: It is clear,
that you are all in your hearts Felons, that you wait only for a moment of
Perjury, Perfidy, Regicide; that in the instant of the Prince s accession,
you will laugh at your Oath and Honesty, trample your Laws and aban-
don the sacred  king, doubly sacred in  his utmost need  of human  kind-
ness. It is clear, that you are the last, the most contemptible of mankind:
Therefore you shall have a Mad-reign . Said and done. They heard, and
blushed dully and adored.
What followed the divisions, the noble indignation of the Irish, the
fire kindled in every worthy man s breast the dreadfull prospect of
domestic wars  proves now that Salomon is right: the Lord is the
guardian of fools.
Now all is an oriental mystery, and a theocratic wonder, and one man
looks at the other and cannot distinguish Sun from Moon; and every fo-
reigner feels the shame of the noble Britton; and all Europe smiles at the
grand Equivoque.
O glorious England! dost thou deserve a smile of disdain,  or still a
tear of pity?
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Introduction
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779)
is one of the best books ever written on natural theology (the at-
tempt to  provide some publicly available evidence in support of
belief in God). The Dialogues
dialogue between a natural theologian, a mystical theologian and a
skeptic, and attempts to do justice to all three positions. The same
three parties are also present in modern-day debates. Some defend
belief in a theistic God using arguments, others try to make room
for a deeper and more mystical theology, and some are just skep-
tics about the existence of God. There are well-informed and intel-
ligent people on both sides of the modern debate.
Recent decades have seen many serious defenses of natural the-
ology. Modern natural theology is defended by Christian philoso-
phers such as William Lane Craig, Robin Collins, J.P. Moreland
and Richard Swinburne, though there are also Christian philoso-
phers critical of natural theology (e.g. Alvin Plantinga). A contro-
versial defense of natural theology has also  been provided by the
of nature are best explained by reference to the action of some in-
telligent agent, and criticizes Darwinian evolutionary theory. Mod-
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ern natural theologians have not accepted the Dialogues as the fi-
nal word on the subject, and they formulate their arguments expli-
be relevant, Humean arguments must be reformulated and new
criticisms have to be developed.
In this paper, I will focus on an important, but seldom discussed
Dialo-
gues contains one such thought experiments by Cleanthes, as well
as a response from Demea and Philo. I will quote the example be-
low, but for now I will paraphrase its idea: If all men simulta-
neously heard a voice from heaven teach wise things, would it not
be reasonable to believe that it has an intelligent, personal cause, in
spite of philosophical ideas which purport to make this impossi-
ble? And does this show the reasonability  of design arguments?
Hume discusses this question, and thus his Dialogues forms a good
starting point for developing criticisms of modern thought experi-
ments in support of design arguments.
In my  paper, I discuss five thought experiments. These are
k-
ing Pulsar, the movie Contact
mostly from the Intelligent Design movement, with John Leslie as
the notable exception. I also  discuss the nature and logical struc-
ture of such thought experiments, and the conclusions we can
make from them.
The Design Argument
To understand the arguments of this paper, some knowledge of
design arguments is necessary. Even after Hume, many  people
continue to feel that the beauty, rational orderliness and the useful
arrangements of the universe reveal the existence, power and wis-
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properties aim to  be empirical arguments to  give evidence of the
existence of a wise creator or at least an intelligent designer with
very  great capabilities. Whereas metaphysical proofs of the exis-
e-
s-
Modern design arguments can be broadly divided into two cate-
gories. First, there are cosmic design arguments based on the over-
all rationality  of the cosmos and the fine-tuning of natural con-
stants benefiting life. These arguments are defended by a broad va-
riety of theistic thinkers and are generally thought to be compatible
with mainstream scientific views. Secondly, there are biological
design arguments based on the apparently purposeful order of bio-
logical organisms. The Intelligent Design movement (ID) is an ex-
ample of a controversial defense of design arguments,  because of
its criticism of evolutionary theory and its intrusion into the realm
of naturalistic science.
The design argument is understood in the Dialogues to work by
analogy. Cleanthes argues as follows:
means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it
much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human
design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the ef-
fects resemble each  other, we are led to infer,  by all the rules of
(Dialogues, part I) In the
modern discussion, the understanding of the design argument as an
analogy  has been questioned. For example, the design argument
can also be formulated as an inference to the best explanation. Be-
modern  design arguments. This is not the subject of this paper,
however (see Ratzsch 2010 for more discussion).
this argument by Philo (Dialogues,  part II). First, for Philo, re-
peated observation is the only reliable way to  demonstrate the
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connection of cause and effect. Because we have not observed the
generation of several universes, we cannot make general claims
about what is required to make one. Secondly, Philo argues that
there is a profound dissimilarity between human works of art and
the cosmos, rendering analogical design arguments unsound.
The Voice From Heaven
x-
periments, starting with the following:
Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds,
much louder and more melodious than any which human art could
ever reach; suppose that this voice were extended in the same instant
over all nations and spoke to each nation in its own language and di-
alect; suppose that that the words delivered not only contain a just
sense and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of
a benevolent Being superior to mankind could you possibly hesi-
tate a moment concerning the cause of this voice, and must you not
instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all
the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against
the system of theism may also be produced against this inference (Di-
alogues, part III).
against this inference. We could argue that we have no example of
any  previous event like this, and therefore an inductive inference
aused
by divine beings before being able to make the inference. An ana-
logical inference could be criticized because of the many dissimi-
larities between human voices and the divine voice. No human
voice could  be so powerful, and no human so  virtuous and wise.
The vocal chords required to produce such a voice would be diffi-
cult to imagine, and so on. Cleanthes argues that such objections
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scepticism: cavils;
and I hope too, you see clearly that they cannot possibly have more
a reductio ad absurdum where Cleanthes is trying to show the fal-
n-
sceptical arguments also work against the evidence in the thought
experiment,  or they do not work at all. So Philo should either re-
ject the intuitive conclusion of design in the case of the voice of
heaven, or also accept it in the biological world. For Cleanthes, the
design argument works both in the case of the voice and  of the
cosmos.
e-
hicles to explore our concepts and their relations by supposing
some counterfactual situation. They are quite common in science
and philosophy. Thought experiments have been used by scientists
like Galileo Galilei (1564 1642) and Albert Einstein (1879 1955)
to great effect, showing the incoherence of rival theories. Famous
s-
type-
writers e-
m-
puters do not think or understand. Thought experiments are varied,
and their simple classification is difficult. Some thought experi-
ments assume only the logical possibility of their example, while
others assume situations that could realistically occur in our known
universe.
The significance of thought experiments is disputed. Some ar-
gue that thought experiments are unreliable guides to philosophical
and scientific truths because of their counterfactual nature. How-
ever, the majority opinion seems to side with the thought experi-
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menters. As long as the background assumptions of thought expe-
riments are not too  bizarre, they serve well to test our concepts.
Thought experiments provide a test of the adequacy of our models,
concepts and intuitions. In both philosophical and scientific dis-
course, our intuitions and models built to support them are impor-
tant. (For some varying opinions of thought experiments, see
Häggvist 1996, Sorensen 1992 and Wilkes 1988)
Other Thought Experiments
I now move on to analyze modern thought experiments, begin-
ning with the Intelligent Design movement. In his article
ID theorist William
k-
a-
tural design is in principle possible, and thus the exclusion of de-
sign from consideration  of possible explanations is not rational.
Suppose that a pulsar star some billions of light years away emits
regular radio magnetic signals, which are found to be a message in
Morse code. As the worldwide scientific community studies the
signal, the pulsar identifies itself as
the God of both Old and New Testaments, the Creator of the un-
To confirm this claim, the
pulsar agrees to answer any questions we might put to it. Soon,
through the messages, medical doctors learn how to cure AIDS,
archaeologists find lost civilizations, physicists find their unifying
theory  of the forces of nature, and mathematicians obtain  proofs
for problems which are impossible to solve without infinite com-
putational resources. Dembski argues that this would be clear evi-
dence of divine design.
Dembski himself acknowledges the outlandishness of his ex-
ample: Probably no theologian would expect God to reveal himself
in this way. Thus the example is for Dembski a mere logical possi-
96 Rope Kojonen
bility, not something that would realistically happen. However, for
him the example demonstrates that i-
This then opens up the pos-
sibility of considering whether we have at least some evidence of
design in our universe. Dembski goes on to argue that design can
also  be the best explanation for some pattern  of nature even if it
the evidence is not quite as strong as in his example. He uses the
thought experiment to simply to open us to consider evidence sev-
eral further questions:
us to postulate design actually occurred, and if so, what are they?
Q2. How subtle can the evidence for design be and still constrain
us to postulate design? In particular, what methods of inquiry
would enable us reliably to  detect these more subtle instances of
(Dembski 1994)
The ID movement also  uses less outlandish examples from
science fiction and from human life. Dembski, Behe and Meyer
Contact (1985, also as a movie in 1997) as an example of how we
might detect the existence of nonhuman intelligence. In Contact, a
signal from space is found to contain a long series of prime num-
bers and the blueprints for a vast machine. The signal is unders-
that this conclusion would  be the only reasonable one, and it
would  be foolish to insist that we search for a materialistic, non-
personal explanation for the message. This is thought to show how
nonhuman design can in principle be detected. The ID theorists go
on to argue that just the same type of order is also found in nature,
for example in the genetic information of organisms, and that this
provides evidence that life is intelligently  designed: the existence
of its features can only be explained if we suppose the operation of
a mind (e.g. Meyer 2009, similarly Dembski 2005, 30).
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Thought experiments are also  used outside the Intelligent De-
sign movement. In his influential book Universes (1986), philoso-
pher John Leslie also uses thought experiments to show that many
objections to the design argument are unreasonable. For example,
it has been argued that we cannot have evidence of design, because
(1) this is the only universe we have observed, (2) it is unreasona-
ble to seek for an explanation for the properties of the laws of na-
ture, since the laws are themselves the fundamental reality, and (3)
there is nothing mysterious about the fact that natural laws allow
for life, because
Responding to these arguments, Leslie formulates his thought
experiment: -begging would be obvious were electron
microscopes to reveal that particles regularly formed long chains
(Leslie 1986,
109). If it is valid to claim that we cannot have evidence of divine
design  because this is the only universe, then surely the pattern
also would be evidence of design. Likewise, if seeking to explain
t a-
sonable even if the basic laws created the pattern? Furthermore, of
course we could not observe the pattern if it did not exist, but this
does not yet provide an explanation for the pattern. Leslie argues
that the order of the cosmos we observe is also reasonable to ex-
plain by reference to the action of a deity, even if the evidence for
divine design is not as obvious as in the example.
Structure of the Argument
Though there are differences in the above thought experiments,
it seems that all of them have roughly the following logical form:
1. Model X says that we cannot have evidence of design unless condi-
tion Y.
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2. In hypothetical situation Z, we have evidence of design, even
though condition Y is not fulfilled.
3. Therefore, model X is faulty and not a trustworthy guide to eva-
luating design arguments.
Thought experiments thus act as evidence against any model of
design detection which does not make sense of the situations im-
agined. For example, suppose that model X argues that we cannot
have evidence of supernatural design unless we already have pre-
vious evidence of the existence of this same supernatural intelli-
i-
ments seem to show that this model is false: we can at least im-
agine situations where we would have evidence of supernatural de-
sign even without fulfilling the condition of prior evidence.
Thought experiments also act as defenses of the premise that if
something functions as evidence of design in the context of human
artifactuality, then it can function as evidence of design even out-
side of this context.
What are we to think of this argument? Though I will soon de-
velop some criticisms, I would argue that these thought experi-
ments actually works against some common criticisms of natural
theology. For example, consider the objection that design cannot
be a good explanation for the order of the universe,  because only
natural and reductionistic explanations are good explanations (e.g.
Dawkins 2006, chapter 4). Would this be a reasonable answer to
the situations in the analogies? Faced with a voice from heaven
n-
sist that only a reductionistic and non-purposeful explanation is
good enough, and that there is no explanatory value to the idea that
there is a mind is needed to create such a voice? I do not think so.
Yet if we should always prefer reductionistic and materialistic ex-
planations over ones involving purposes and minds, then this
would also make it irrational to accept design in these hypothetical
situations. This seems to count against these defenses of material-
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ism.
problematic, as has been shown by numerous critiques.)
Criticism of the Argument
Now it could still be, even given the thought experiments, that
evidence for divine design  or using  design to increase our under-
standing of the world is conceptually impossible. This can be true
if the concept of divine design is itself somehow contradictory.
Then  perhaps the thought experiments themselves are confused.
Some thinkers in the modern  debate on theism and atheism have
argued in this way. Some even argue that even the concept of hu-
man  design is incoherent: in reality, consciousness is an illusion.
However, such views are rather extreme and not accepted as rea-
sonable by the majority commenters.
Though the ID theorists and other defenders of the design ar-
gument often use thought experiments, they are more rarely com-
mented on by the naturalistic critics of these arguments. Robert
and
Perakh and Matt Young provide two exceptions. Pennock argues
between the Talking Pulsar and the biological evidence:
case we infer an intelligent signaller not because these are cases
of complex specified information in a generic sense, but because
the pattern of information matches a previously known pattern that
(Pennock 1999, 254).
x-
ample of an alien bulldozer, recognizable as designed  despite our
lack of knowledge about the designer, is misleading. After all, the
bulldozer can still be recognized as a bulldozer, leading to much
l-
so has signs of artifactuality. Organisms, on the other hand, do not
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have such a clear purpose for their designer, and have the capabili-
ty of undergoing evolution. Thus differences between the thought
experiments and the evidence we actually  have is crucial for the
critics: e know nothing whatsoever about the alleged disembo-
died  designer of the intelligent design theory or about what that
different from bulldozers and poems. A reference to such a design-
er lacks explanatory power (Perakh & Young 2006, 194 195).
It seems to me that in these responses to thought experiments,
critics of the design argument make some important concessions to
defenders of the design argument. The critics affirm here that
previousl which we associate with intelligence
can be evidence of design even outside the context of human activ-
ity. Thus the in  principle possibility  of evidence for design is ad-
mitted, and many objections to  design arguments have to  be
waived. However,  because thought experiments are hypothetical,
they do not themselves provide evidence of design, but only test
our concepts. This leaves open a number of criticisms of the design
argument, such as the idea that there is a crucial difference be-
tween our situation and the thought experiments.
I will now sketch some more durable Humean criticisms of
these thought experiments. I do not argue that these criticisms are
unanswerable. However, to me they are still the best criticisms of
these thought experiments. First, the order of nature is different
from the cases in these analogies, and the evidence for design thus
i-
lo argues that the order of the cosmos is not like human artefacts,
but can also  be compared to  other types of order, such as that of
vegetables which seem to  grow by themselves. Philo argues that
the differences make it possible to argue that even if there is an
analogy to the human mind in the cause, this analogy is at best
very distant.
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-
depth analysis of design arguments. Ratzsch differentiates between
several markers of intelligent design  used in the human context.
ple, on reading a li-
terary work, the structure appears so clearly rational to the human
mind. The idea that there is a designer is forced on us in a way that
does not depend on our prior knowledge that humans produce
books. Many of the situations in the thought experiments, such as
the voice from heaven, are examples of mind affinity. But Ratzsch
also defines other types of evidence which we use to detect design
in the human context, such a
of commonality with our mind. The order of the universe does in-
deed appear rational to  us, and science depends on this supposi-
tion, but the rationality is not the rationality of a message. Ratzsch
argues that this order does give evidence of design even outside
the human context: if some property is evidence of design in the
human context, then it will be evidence for design even outside the
context of known human activity. However,  his distinction could
also  be used to argue, as Hume does, the difference between the
order of the cosmos and the thought experiments (Ratzsch 2001).
The second line of Humean criticism I would develop is the re-
ligious criticism of natural theology. In the Dialogues, both Demea
and Philo argue that the design argument can only show the exis-
tence of some powerful and wise intelligent creator, but that this is
. Philo also  uses the problem
of natural evil to argue the same point. The design argument is ar-
is no God, why is the order of nature so rational? Philo  uses the
problem of natural evil to argue that the order of nature is actually
not that good, and that the hypothesis of a good creator does not
make sense. At most we might say that the Creator is of an un-
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known  nature,  having only a distant analogy to the human mind
(Dialogues, part X).
Design arguments require an account which leaves room for a
realistic description  of God as a designer, though acknowledging
that God is much more (such as the ground of being). While
argument is nevertheless sound. I would supplant this line of ar-
gument with some broader theological arguments. For example, it
can be argued that the rationality of religious communities and be-
liefs is based on quite broad  grounds, not just the arguments of
natural theology, which many deeply religious people are even un-
aware of (see e.g. Vainio 2010). When emphasizing the need for
evidence for belief, there is the danger of scientism: the idea that
this evidence must be scientific in nature. Scientism would negate
the power of everyday and religious experience and the role of re-
ligious communities and authorities in forming religious beliefs,
which would be devastating for traditional Christianity (Stenmark
2001). And if God is thought of primarily as a designer, then it is
easily missed that the doctrine of creation is not about physics so
much as about the dependence of all things on their Creator (Cun-
ningham 2010).
Conclusion
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion continues to be relevant for the current discussion on nat-
ural theology and design arguments. Thought experiments such as
the voice from heaven represent just one class of arguments that
are still being repeated today. They function to test our models of
how we could  have evidence of both human and divine design. I
have argued that the thought experiments do provide evidence
against some models of how we detect design, namely those mod-
els which rule out the possibility  of evidence for design a priori.
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For example, the argument that we cannot seek explanations for
e-
sign, since we have only observed one universe, seem faulty.
However, in the Dialogues, the thought experiments do not
mark the end of the discussion in the favour of the natural theolo-
gian. Rather, Hume shows us how to develop a more enduring cri-
tique of these thought experiments and design arguments. These
are based on the following premises: (1) the order of nature is dif-
ferent from the cases in these analogies, and the evidence for de-
i-
gious belief in God, in any case, requires more than the design ar-
gument. These counterarguments aim more at limiting the power
of design arguments and opening up the possibility for scepticism
rather than a proof against the very possibility  of design argu-
ments. Thus they make it possible to formulate a response which
takes the thought experiments into account.
Defenders of the design argument, on the other hand, need to
argue the broader theological and religious case, as well (as is in-
deed done in e.g. Craig & Moreland 2010). If they present a prob-
lem of natural good for atheists, this can  be balanced with a dis-
cussion of the problem of natural evil. Thought experiments can be
expanded into a full-fledged  defense of the logic of design argu-
ments, and design arguments need to be linked to the wider discus-
sion on theism and religion. All of these issues are discussed in
Dialogues, and thus the work continues to  be important
for the modern discussion of design arguments.
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